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SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
THE WAKE OF INDIA’S RECENT  
SODOMY CASES 
DEEPA DAS ACEVEDO* 
Abstract: American constitutional law scholars have long questioned whether 
courts can truly drive social reform, and this uncertainty remains even in the 
wake of recent landmark decisions affecting the LGBT community. In contrast, 
court watchers in India—spurred by developments in a special type of legal ac-
tion developed in the late 1970s known as public interest litigation (PIL)—have 
only recently begun to question the judiciary’s ability to promote progressive 
social change. Indian scholarship on this point has veered between despair that 
PIL cases no longer reliably produce good outcomes for India’s most disadvan-
taged and optimism that public interest litigation can be returned to its glory 
days of heroic judicial intervention. Perhaps no pair of cases so nicely captures 
this dichotomy as the 2009 decision in Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT 
of Delhi, which decriminalized sodomy, and the 2012 decision in Koushal v. 
Naz Foundation, which overruled Naz. This paper uses public interest litigation 
and India’s recent sodomy cases to demonstrate that the relationship between 
state actors and citizens is often far less stable than the democratic ideal of “citi-
zen sovereignty” would suggest. I argue, first, that supporters of public interest 
litigation should neither give up on PIL suits as a means of effecting social re-
form nor imagine that PIL suits can ever reliably produce desirable outcomes. 
As a type of legal action, public interest litigation simply cannot be reverse en-
gineered in this way. But second, I show why this unreliability is not as worri-
some as it might first appear to be, by analyzing the well-documented and wide-
ly critiqued shift in PIL cases at the end of the twentieth century. While earlier 
PIL cases reflect the Indian Constitution’s commitment to government-led so-
cial reform and the sharing of sovereignty between citizens and the state, con-
temporary PIL cases reflect the Constitution’s commitment to an agency theory 
of sovereignty whereby government merely acts on behalf of citizens. Neither 
vision of sovereignty is paramount over the long run, and shifts in public inter-
est litigation reflect the productive and dynamic equilibrium between the two. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The idea of legal liberalism—that courts can be the means of progres-
sive social change—has been on something of a roller-coaster ride in the 
United States.1 Scholars documenting the ups and downs of this journey 
usually begin with the rise of legal realism toward the end of the nineteenth 
century and the subsequent development of legal process theory.2 They then 
usually focus on the Warren Court, followed by the Supreme Court’s con-
servative turn in the 1970s and 1980s, before tapering off around the rise of 
neo-republican theory in the 1980s and 90s.3 More recently, Obergefell v. 
Hodges4 and its precursors have prompted some commentators—usually 
critics5—to argue that the Court is once again acting as an agent of social 
change, although many others from across the ideological spectrum have 
rejected this view.6 For the most part, American legal liberalism has been 
having a rough time of it for around three decades.7 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996) (calling legal 
liberalism “trust in the potential of courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to bring about ‘those 
specific social reforms that affect large groups of people such as blacks, or workers, or women, or 
partisans of a particular persuasion; in other words, policy chance with nationwide impact’”). 
 2 See, e.g., id. at 13–22. 
 3 See, e.g., id. at 8–9. For similar but non-identical accounts, see Michal R. Belknap, The 
Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 68–71 
(1998), and Louis Michael Seidman, J. Skelly Wright and the Limits of Legal Liberalism, 61 LOY. 
L. REV. 69, 71 (2015). 
 4 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 5 E.g., David Upham, Symposium: A Tremendous Defeat for “We the People” and Our Pos-
terity, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 4:26 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-
a-tremendous-defeat-for-we-the-people-and-our-posterity/ [https://perma.cc/29H6-BJY9] (“[I]t 
[cannot] plausibly be said that the people at large have generally demanded today’s result. As the 
Court noted, the states and the people remain deeply divided.”). 
 6 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (questioning the Supreme Court’s ability to effect widespread social 
change); Stephen M. Feldman, (Same) Sex, Lies, and Democracy: Tradition, Religion, and Substan-
tive Due Process (with an Emphasis on Obergefell v. Hodges), 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 341, 
351 (2015) (“Supreme Court decisions, including Obergefell, do not wield sufficient power to change 
society independently of other societal and cultural forces.”); Ilya Shapiro, Introduction, 2015 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9–10 (“The result [in Obergefell] was wholly expected given the rapid shifts in 
popular opinion on the subject, as well as the Court’s ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act two 
years ago in United States v. Windsor . . . .”); Kyle C. Velte, Obergefell’s Expressive Promise, 6 
HOUS. L. REV.: OFF REC. 157, 161 (2015), http://www.houstonlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/11/Velte_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU9E-353W] (“Because Obergefell’s holding—‘[t]he 
nugget that will have binding precedential effect’—is narrow, it will not regulate behavior outside of 
marriage. It will not prohibit discrimination against LGBT individuals in other contexts. Thus, the 
promise that Obergefell holds to effect broad, positive change—to propel the law toward formal 
equality—is in its expressive power.”). 
 7 Of course, whether courts can—and should—be agents of social reform is hardly a uniquely 
American debate. Similar conversations occur, for instance, among scholars of Israeli law in re-
gard to the successfulness and desirability of values-based judging and among Canadian Charter 
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Like the United States, India is experiencing something of a downward 
adjustment in the way scholars, lawyers, and judges think of court-driven 
progressive change, but the context and implications of this shift are hugely 
and necessarily distinct. Let’s begin with some constitutional prose. The 
Indian Constitution prohibits the practice of untouchability, opens Hindu 
temples to government oversight, grants an affirmative right to primary ed-
ucation, and has sixteen non-justiceable (but frequently discussed and inter-
preted) articles that commit the state to trying its hand at everything from 
minimizing economic inequality to constructing a uniform civil code that 
can replace religious personal laws.8 Unsurprisingly, comparative analyses 
of the Indian and American constitutions have usually characterized the 
former as “militant” and the latter as “acquiescent” in terms of the relation-
ship they envision between the state and society.9 In this narrative, India’s 
founding document sets up a state that seeks to reform society by challeng-
ing old practices and affirming new rights. Conversely, the American Con-
stitution seeks merely to preserve the status quo.10 For anyone subscribing 
to this vision of Indian constitutionalism, signs that legal liberalism may be 
on the wane carry a different and arguably a more dispiriting significance in 
India than they would in the United States. 
                                                                                                                           
scholars on either side of the court-party thesis. On values-based judging, compare MENACHEM 
MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 38 (2011) (critically describing the “courts as 
agents of liberal values”), with Aharon Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy, 33 
ISR. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1999) (arguing that “[t]he democratic character of our regime, and the social 
values derived from it . . . constitute a system of principles and values according to which the 
judge creates law. . . . The judge gives expression to all these”). On the role of courts in effecting 
social change in Israel, compare Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a 
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 46–47 (2002) (stating that while a su-
preme court cannot “cure every ill of society” or “be the primary agent for social change” it “has 
an important role in bridging the gap between law and society and in protecting the fundamental 
values of democracy with human rights at the center”), with Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in 
Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216, 218 (1999) (“[I]n rifted democracies [like Israel], courts 
should be reluctant to determine specific arrangements and priorities, especially in areas of social 
controversy, where the grounds of judicial action are not clear.”). The court-party thesis is the idea 
that citizen interest groups drive judicial interpretation of the Charter and that “judges drive the 
Charter, not vice versa.” F.L. Morton, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party, 30 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 627, 630 (1992); see also Lise Gotell, Book Review, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 883, 896 (2005) 
(reviewing CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, FEMINIST ACTIVISM IN THE SUPREME COURT: LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION AND THE WOMEN’S LEGAL EDUCATION AND ACTION FUND (2004)). 
 8 INDIA CONST. art. 17 (prohibition of untouchability); id. art. 21(A) (right to education); id. 
art. 25, cl. (2)(a) (authority to regulate practices associated with religious exercise); id. art. 25, cl. 
(2)(b) (opening of Hindu institutions to all classes and sections of Hindus); id. art. 38(1) (minimiz-
ing economic inequality); id. arts. 36–51 (non-justiciable rights); id. art. 44 (Uniform Civil Code). 
 9 GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 214, 216–17 (2010). Note that 
Jacobsohn acknowledges that both constitutions “contain preservative and transformative ele-
ments.” Id. at 214. 
 10 Id. at 214. 
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There are great problems with relying on this kind of constitutional 
shorthand in general and with subscribing to this characterization of the Indi-
an Constitution in particular. An important goal of this paper is to argue that 
Indian constitutional jurisprudence actually and appropriately reflects a dy-
namic equilibrium between two very different visions of state-society rela-
tions, rather than being straightforwardly committed to state-led reform.11 
Each of these visions of state-society relations corresponds to an understand-
ing of how sovereignty works in a democracy. Some elements of the Indian 
Constitution reflect a fairly conventional agency view of governmental au-
thority,12 while others envision such an active or militant role for government 
that it is difficult to characterize the state as merely the agent of the sovereign 
people.13 Since neither of these visions of sovereignty is—or is meant to be—
paramount over the long run, they exist in a perpetual yet dynamic equilibri-
um with one another. Part III will briefly describe these two visions and ex-
plain how they are borne up by the specific aspect of Indian law, public inter-
est litigation, that’s at issue here.  
A second reason why a decline in legal liberalism has different impli-
cations for India is that the history of court-driven change (as opposed to 
broadly state-driven change) as well as the public reception of such change 
have been markedly different there.14 While Indian courts have always had 
an important role in advancing and upholding progressive policies,15 they 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Deepa Das Acevedo, Temples, Courts, and Dynamic Equilibrium in the Indian Constitu-
tion, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2016). 
 12 On the agency theory of democratic sovereignty, see, for example, id. at 573–74 (describ-
ing how many contract theories of democracy view sovereignty “like an object whose ownership 
can’t really be shared” but that needs to be delegated from “the people” to their representatives for 
the purposes of effective governance). 
 13 Id. at 575 (“[T]he [Indian] Constitution . . . envisions a state with huge independent discre-
tion to control social ordering . . . . Having that kind of discretion baked right into one’s constitu-
tional cake means that sovereignty can’t be wholly owned by citizens: it has to be shared by both 
citizens and the state.”). 
 14 See, e.g., K.G. Balakrishnan, Chief Justice of India, Fifteenth Annual Lecture at the Singa-
pore Academy of Law: Growth of Public Interest Litigation in India (Oct. 8, 2008). The Chief 
Justice—speaking on legal liberalism in India—remarked: 
The main rationale for “judicial activism” in India lies in the highly unequal social 
profile of our population, where judges must take proactive steps to protect the in-
terests of those who do not have a voice in the political system and do not have the 
means or information to move the Courts. This places the Indian Courts in a very 
different social role as compared to several developed nations where directions giv-
en by ‘unelected judges’ are often viewed as unjustified restraints on the will of the 
majority. 
Id. 
 15 Consider, for instance, the courts’ role in upholding the constitutional mandate to open 
Hindu temples to members of all castes. C. J. Fuller, Hinduism and Scriptural Authority in Mod-
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have been especially prominent since the rise of public interest litigation in 
the 1970s.16 
Unlike in the United States, where “public interest law” refers to legal 
work and advocacy done for the greater good or for those who cannot afford 
representation,17 Indian “public interest litigation” (PIL) is a distinct way of 
articulating a legal complaint, much like filing an individual civil suit is 
different from filing a class action or an administrative grievance.18 Fram-
ing a complaint as a PIL suit allows petitioners to avoid traditional standing 
requirements (like personal harm)19 and briefing requirements (like the 
submission of formal writ petitions) in the interest of removing barriers to 
justice for the most disadvantaged.20 Additionally, courts hearing PIL suits 
often act as quasi-arbitrators, conduct independent fact-finding, and require 
periodic progress reports from the parties.21 And not infrequently, courts 
                                                                                                                           
ern Indian Law, 30 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 225 (1988) (describing temple-entry cases in 
which the courts creatively interpret Hindu scriptures to show their agreement with constitutional 
values). 
 16 Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 107 (1985) (using the term “social action litigation”). 
Baxi writes: 
For too long, the apex constitutional court had become “an arena of legal quibbling 
for men with long purses.” Now, increasingly, the Court is being identified by jus-
tices as well as people as the “last resort for the oppressed and the bewildered.” . . . 
The medium through which all this has happened, and is happening, is social action 
litigation, a distinctive by-product of the catharsis of the 1975–1976 Emergency. 
Id. at 107–08 (footnotes omitted). 
 17 See, e.g., What Is Public Interest Law?, HARV. L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-
is-public-interest-law/ [https://perma.cc/KGJ3-XVKT] (defining public interest law by practice 
setting, work type, and issue area, among other things). 
 18 See Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 497–501 (1989); Ashok H. Desai & S. Muralidhar, Public 
Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 159, 162–67 (B.N. 
Kirpal et al. eds., 2000). 
 19 See Baxi v. Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 308 (1981) (an early classic in public interest 
litigation that featured a famous law professor petitioning on behalf of the residents of a women’s 
home). 
 20 See Khatri v. Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 928 (benchmark case in which a lawyer forwarded a 
newspaper article detailing prison abuses to the Supreme Court and the court treated the article as 
a writ petition). Khatri and its companion cases Khatri v. Bihar, (1981) 2 SCR 408, and Khatri v. 
Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 635, are collectively known as the “Bhagalpur Blinding Cases” and gave rise 
to what is commonly known in India as epistolary jurisdiction. Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices 
in the Court of India Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
57, 58 & n.3 (1994). 
 21 Videh Upadhyay, Changing Judicial Power: Courts on Infrastructure Projects and Envi-
ronment, 35 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3789, 3790–91 (2000) (discussing the “proliferation of court-
appointed committees” in PIL suits). One of Upadhyay’s examples is Rural Litig. & Entitlement 
Kendra v. Uttar Pradesh, (1985) 3 SCR 169, in which the court appointed expert committees to 
determine whether mining in the Doon Valley had adverse environmental impact and also created 
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themselves instigate PIL “suits” by taking suo motu cognizance of specific 
issues.22 
Given these striking features and the stack of extremely progressive 
PIL cases that were decided early on—not to mention a sense that India’s 
executive and legislative branches are incapable of governing—it’s no 
wonder that public interest litigation is viewed as a crucial tool for a court 
focused on “good governance.”23 Simultaneously, however, PIL cases have 
become a popular tool for petitioners pursuing urban, middle-class, or so-
cially conservative ends—so much so, in fact, that contemporary scholar-
ship on public interest litigation is overwhelmingly preoccupied with asking 
if this much-beloved hallmark of Indian jurisprudence can be saved or even 
defended.24 
Few cases better reflect the shifting tone of public interest litigation 
and legal liberalism in India than the 2009 opinion in Naz Foundation v. 
Government of NCT of Delhi25 that decriminalized sodomy and the 2013 
Koushal v. Naz Foundation26 decision that reversed Naz. Naz was filed in 
the Delhi High Court by an NGO focusing on HIV/AIDS and sexual-health 
issues, while Koushal was filed in the Supreme Court by lead petitioners 
described as “citizens of India who believe they have the moral responsibil-
ity and duty in protecting [the] cultural values of Indian society.”27 Read 
together, Naz and Koushal express the primary argument of this paper—at 
                                                                                                                           
a monitoring committee which continued to oversee “quarrying and mining operations in the Val-
ley even more than a decade after the final disposal of the case in 1988.” Upadhyay, supra, at 
3790. 
 22 Marc Galanter & Vasujith Ram, Suo Moto Intervention and the Indian Judiciary 1, 15, 18 
tbl.1, 21 tbl.2 (Sept. 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 23 See Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance 
Court, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (discussing “the Court’s development of 
two new tools—the basic structure doctrine and its expanded right to life jurisprudence—to ad-
dress . . . apparent failings of representative governance”). 
 24 E.g., SHOBHA AGGARWAL, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION HOAX 10–11 (2005) (argu-
ing that public interest litigation has faltered because of the Supreme Court’s shift away from 
principles of “natural justice”); Prashant Bhushan, Supreme Court and PIL: Changing Perspec-
tives Under Liberalisation, 39 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1770, 1774 (2004) (arguing that “it is indeed 
tempting to argue that the recent drawing back of the court in PIL . . . is because the court has in 
fact bought the ideology underlying the economic reforms” because such a “hypothesis does seem 
to offer the simplest explanation for the above decisions of the court”); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, 
Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a 
Social Movement Perspective, 8 HUM. RTS. REV. 157, 158–60, 163–64, 167 (2007) (arguing that 
“the Court’s activism increasingly manifests several biases—in favor of the state and develop-
ment, in favor of the rich and against workers, in favor of the urban middle-class and against rural 
farmers”). 
 25 (2009) 160 DLT 277 (Delhi High Ct.). 
 26 (2014) 1 SCC 1 (2013). 
 27Koushal, (2014) 1 SCC at 24; Naz, (2009) 160 DLT at 285. 
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once narrow and extremely contentious (at least among scholars of Indian 
law)—that public interest litigation can never reliably advance certain kinds 
of progressive outcomes. 
To be perfectly clear, I am not just arguing that PIL cases have increas-
ingly produced outcomes favoring advantaged litigants. This descriptive 
argument has already been made, with excellent empirical support and in 
many different areas of the law, by several lawyers and legal academics.28 
Nor am I advocating any particular way of “fixing” public interest litigation 
so that it returns to its early focus on removing barriers to justice, expanding 
or enforcing constitutional rights, and resolving group-based disadvantages. 
Packing the Indian Supreme Court with 1980s-style activist justices is unre-
alistic, while urging sitting justices to abandon their command-and-control 
model of case management for a more facilitative one may offer procedural 
improvements but is unlikely to restore public interest litigation’s focus on 
the country’s most marginalized citizens.29 Indeed, if the only thing that will 
resuscitate the worth of public interest litigation is the kind of rights-
enforcing opinions common during the first ten to fifteen years of PIL histo-
ry, I am quite doubtful that there is anything we can concertedly do. 
But this—despite the heartbreaking outcome in Koushal—may not be 
as bad as it sounds. For one thing, a few recent examples suggest that public 
                                                                                                                           
 28 E.g., SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, SCALING JUSTICE: INDIA’S SUPREME COURT, ANTI-TERROR 
LAWS, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 144, 157 (2009) (finding that “[j]udgments after 1988 were 17 per 
cent less likely to favour health/education rights that [sic] those issued before 1988” and that Su-
preme Court judges “appointed after 1998 were 18 per cent less likely to rule in favour of the 
rights to health and education”); Rakesh Shukla, Rights of the Poor: An Overview of Supreme 
Court, 41 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3755 (2006) (reviewing recent PIL cases across several areas of 
law); Varun Gauri, Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? 13 
(World Bank Dev. Research, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5109, 2009) (using quantitative 
analysis to argue that “judicial receptivity in the Supreme Court to Fundamental Rights claims 
made on behalf of poor and excluded individuals has declined in recent years”); Varun Gauri & 
Poorvi Chitalkar, The Distributional Impact of Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Supreme 
Court—an Update 1, 5–6, 8, 12 (Sept. 25–26, 2015) (conference paper) (on file with author) (ar-
riving at a similar conclusion after examining beneficiary inequalities in recent PIL cases). 
 29 See Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Revisiting The Role of the Judiciary in Plural Societies (1987): 
A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Public Interest Litigation in India and the Global South, in 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA 341, 362–65 (Sunil Khilnani et al. eds., 2013) 
(arguing for a more facilitative role and sketching its contents). Thiruvengadam also observes that 
“[s]ome [unnamed] progressives have implicitly suggested that what is required is . . . . a new gener-
ation of judges in the mould of [early PIL-friendly justices] be appointed,” a suggestion he rightfully 
responds to by saying that “such a view is both unrealistic and problematic.” Id. at 357–58. See also 
Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a Bitter PIL? Reflections on Progressive Strategies for Public 
Interest Litigation in India, in TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: COMPARING THE APEX 
COURTS OF BRAZIL, INDIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA 519, 528 (Oscar Vilhena et al. eds., 2013) [hereinaf-
ter Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a Bitter PIL?]. 
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interest litigation isn’t, in a consequentialist sense, already a lost cause.30 
More importantly, the kind of court-driven progressive social reform cap-
tured in the early PIL cases, vital and thrilling as it is, is only half the story 
of democratic governance in India. State-driven reform, however rights-
enhancing it may be, does not so define Indian democracy that the periodic 
(or even somewhat frequent) failure of PIL cases to achieve progressive 
outcomes spells decay and doom. Rather, the dynamic interplay between a 
fairly conventional, citizen-sovereignty vision of democratic government 
and a more unusual support for state- and court-led reform gives Indian de-
mocracy the flexibility it needs to survive over the long run. 
Because public interest litigation is this paper’s window into the rela-
tionship between courts, social change, and sovereignty, Part I overviews 
the belief in the ameliorative potential of PIL suits as well as recent disillu-
sionment on that front. Part II zeroes in on Naz and Koushal, outlining the 
reasoning and the vision of state-society relations envisioned in each deci-
sion. Part III briefly summarizes the idea of dynamic equilibrium as a theo-
ry of constitutional identity and design before exploring how the overall 
changes in PIL outcomes (discussed in Part I) and the specific outcomes in 
Naz and Koushal (discussed in Part II) exemplify that structure. For the le-
gal liberals among us, describing Indian constitutional jurisprudence and 
public interest litigation this way should be both reassuring and worrisome: 
PIL cases may not be failing progressives as much as is commonly feared, 
but they were never meant to be sure-fire tools of reform, either. 
I. PUBLIC CONFUSION OVER PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
Indian lawyers and law scholars generally describe the initial period of 
Supreme Court PIL suits—roughly, the late 1970s through early 1990s—in 
the language of heroic judicial intervention.31 A former Chief Justice of the 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See, e.g., Nat’l Legal Services Auth. v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1863 (legally recog-
nizing a “third gender” and directing national and state governments to create reservations for 
third gender individuals in educational institutions and public employment); Peoples Union for 
Civil Liberties v. Union of India, WP(C) No. 196/2001 (Nov. 28, 2001 interim order), http://www.
righttofoodindia.org/orders/nov28.html [https://perma.cc/L9VM-JY82] (requiring state govern-
ments to provide every child attending a government or government-aided primary school with a 
free, cooked midday meal). 
 31 The Indian Supreme Court is a court of original jurisdiction for plaintiffs who assert fun-
damental rights violations under Article 32, and has been the “pivot in the development of PIL 
jurisprudence in India.” Shyam Divan, Public Interest Litigation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 662, 664 (Sujit Choudhry et al. eds., 2016). PIL suits can also be 
heard by High Courts under Article 226, and many important PIL cases have been decided by 
these courts. See INDIA CONST. art. 226. However, scholarly debates over public interest litigation 
have generally focused on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Divan, supra. 
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Supreme Court called public interest litigation “a potent weapon” and an 
example of how “[j]udicial creativity . . . has enabled realisation of the 
promise of socio-economic justice made in the Preamble to the Constitution 
of India.”32 One of India’s most prominent legal scholars declared, during 
the early days of public interest litigation, that “[t]he Supreme Court of In-
dia is at long last becoming, after thirty two years of the Republic, the Su-
preme Court for Indians.”33 And this sentiment is not unwarranted: early 
PIL cases forced negligent town councils to provide slum dwellers with 
basic sanitation facilities,34 released individuals whose pre-trial detentions 
exceeded the maximum penalty for their alleged crimes,35 and compensated 
women raped by on-duty Indian soldiers.36 In other words, public interest 
litigation has unarguably been thought of as a vehicle for advancing equali-
ty and affirmative rights, and in many instances it has—also unarguably—
been successful in this mission. 
Besides raw outcomes, the good vibes surrounding public interest litiga-
tion emanate from a sense that the Supreme Court devised the approach and 
PIL petitioners continue to use it only out of sheer necessity. Governmental 
malfunction is a longstanding theme in Indian politics, especially at the feder-
al level. Indeed, “malfunction” is a kind of extreme euphemism for much of 
what happens in New Delhi: in 2014, thirty-four percent of sitting Lok Sabha 
members faced criminal charges,37 the last ten years alone have seen a num-
ber of scandals with price tags between USD $30–40 billion a piece,38 and the 
current Prime Minister was under criminal investigation as late as 2012 in 
connection with the mass killing of Muslims in his state during his chief min-
                                                                                                                           
 32 A.S. Anand, Judicial Review––Judicial Activism—Need for Caution, in LAW & JUSTICE 
377, 383 (Soli J. Sorabjee ed., 2004). 
 33 Baxi, supra note 16, at 107; see also Jasper Vikas George, Public Interest Litigation: Social 
Change and Public Interest Litigation in India, NGOS INDIA (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.ngosindia.
com/resources/pil_sc.php [https://perma.cc/A9YZ-UHLP] (calling public interest litigation the 
product of “two justices . . . [who] recognised the possibility of providing access to justice to the 
poor and the exploited people by relaxing the rules of standing”). 
 34 Ratlam v. Vardhichand, (1981) 1 SCR 97, 105–06, 113 (1980). 
 35 Khatoon v. Bihar, (1979) 3 SCR 169. 
 36 Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India, (1994) 4 SCR Supp. 528. 
 37 Rukmini S., 16th Lok Sabha Will Be Richest, Have Most MPs with Criminal Charges, HINDU 
(May 19, 2014, 2:17 AM), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/16th-lok-sabha-will-be-richest-
have-most-mps-with-criminal-charges/article6022513.ece [https://perma.cc/FV4E-CGRQ] (noting 
that this represents an increase from thirty percent in 2009 and twenty-four percent in 2004). The Lok 
Sabha is the lower house of Parliament. See id. 
 38 Beina Xu, Governance in India: Corruption, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 4, 2014), 
http://www.cfr.org/corruption-and-bribery/governance-india-corruption/p31823 [https://perma.cc/
F53S-W2QU] (describing, among others, the 2010–11 “Telecom” scandal, with an estimated 
governmental cost of $39 billion, and the 2012 “Coalgate” scandal, with an estimated cost of $34 
billion). 
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istership.39 In 2015, India ranked seventy-sixth on Transparency Internation-
al’s Corruption Perception Index, which is actually an improvement over its 
2013 performance (ninety-fourth).40 Matters had reached such a pitch by 
2011 that an activist named Anna Hazare gained significant political traction 
for the idea of a people’s ombudsman with independent prosecutorial authori-
ty and police powers over virtually the entire federal government.41 There is 
even a small but identifiable genre of anti-corruption cinema that is equal 
parts fantasy and self-flagellation.42 
All of this has rather understandably fed into strong support for public 
interest litigation. While the federal judiciary’s halo has lately become a bit 
tarnished, it still enjoys a reputation for good intentions and efficacy that 
vastly outstrips anything the executive or legislative branches could hope 
for.43 This reputational advantage, combined with the very real failures of 
                                                                                                                           
 39 For an overview of relevant court cases and investigations that were written before Naren-
dra Modi became Prime Minister, see India: A Decade on, Gujarat Justice Incomplete, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Feb. 24, 2012, 4:22 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/24/india-decade-gujarat-
justice-incomplete [https://perma.cc/3F8P-VS6G]. For an account of investigation efforts that 
have taken place since Modi took office, and of the harassment endured by the investigators, see 
David Barstow, Longtime Critic of Modi Is Now a Target, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/world/asia/teesta-setalvad-modi-india.html [https://perma.cc/VVJ8-
9TGM]. 
 40 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2015, http://files.transparency.org/
content/download/1952/12820/file/2015_CPI_ReportInfographicsZIP.zip [https://perma.cc/ZN3Z-
X87X]; TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2013, http://files.transparency.
org/content/download/700/3007/file/2013_CPIBrochure_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LM2-Z4Y3]; 
Xu, supra note 38. 
 41 See Sumanta Banerjee, Anna Hazare, Civil Society, and the State, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 
12, 12–13 (2011). Although the idea of an ombudsman (or “lokpal”) bill had surfaced regularly 
for decades, the bill, fittingly, always got stuck in Parliament. See Aditi Malhotra & Saptarishi 
Dutta, Timeline: The Lokpal’s Long Walk to Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/12/18/timeline-the-lokpals-long-walk-to-law/ [https://perma.cc/
C9YX-5XLE]. It was eventually passed on December 18, 2013. A to Z of Lokpal Bill: India’s 
Answer to Fighting Corruption, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013, 4:07 PM), http://www.hindustan
times.com/india/a-to-z-of-lokpal-bill-india-s-answer-to-fighting-corruption/story-C0xfOEX1vNd
xgvYq8B1DFK.html [https://perma.cc/A2M2-5KT2]; Malhotra & Dutta, supra. 
 42 For a tiny slice of this genre, see, for example, INDIAN (Sri Surya Movies 1996); 
MUDHALVAN (Sri Surya Films 1999); NO ONE KILLED JESSICA (UTV Spotboy 2011); RANG DE 
BASANTI (ROMP 2006); SATYAGRAHA (UTV Motion Pictures 2013) (explicitly inspired by Anna 
Hazare). 
 43 The federal judiciary did not always enjoy such high esteem—indeed, the development of 
public interest litigation was closely tied to the courts’ fall from grace during Indira Gandhi’s 
Emergency of 1975–77. Upendra Baxi, The Avatars of Indian Judicial Activism: Explorations in 
the Geographies of [In]Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: ITS GRASP 
AND REACH 156, 157 (S.K. Verma & Kusum eds., 2000). The judiciary’s reputation has suffered a 
bit recently thanks to allegations of corrupt personal finances, case-fixing, and irregular promotion 
practices. See Shoma Chaudhry, Half of the Last 16 Chief Justices Were Corrupt, TEHELKA (Sept. 
5, 2009), http://www.vigilonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1182 [https://
perma.cc/A6AL-JJZ7]; Manoj Mitta, A Few Just Men Who Raised the Bar, TIMES OF INDIA (May 
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the other branches and the very real success of early PIL cases, has led sup-
porters of public interest litigation to argue that the courts merely step in to 
right the wrongs committed by other branches.44 Some commentators main-
tain that given certain procedural aspects of public interest litigation—non-
adversarial engagement, ongoing investigation, periodic reporting—courts 
are in fact compensating for the lack of a “genuine deliberative forum” in 
the legislature.45 At the very least, many supporters of public interest litiga-
tion suggest that the other branches’ failure to realize the substantive ends 
of democracy makes them no more representative as institutions than the 
unelected but populist judiciary.46 That is to say, the classic and still domi-
nant view is that public interest litigation is good on both principled and 
consequentialist grounds. 
Recently, however, the veneer has started to peel. Several commentators 
argue that public interest litigation simply doesn’t protect disadvantaged citi-
zens the way it used to.47 For one thing, there has been a series of landmark 
cases whose outcomes favored corporate or urban middle-class interests over 
those of more vulnerable populations: the “dam” cases, in which thousands of 
                                                                                                                           
16, 2010, 3:56 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-toi/special-report/A-few-
just-men-who-raised-the-bar/articleshow/5936089.cms [https://perma.cc/ABY2-9ZCE]. 
 44 Gobind Das, The Supreme Court: An Overview, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE, supra 
note 18 at 17 (“Faced with a liberal and enlightened executive it sought to cooperate with it, con-
fronted with an aggressive and bellicose one the courts stepped aside, and when the executive was 
weak or negligent the courts were obliged to step in to ensure that the needs of the people were 
met.”). 
 45 Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Evaluating Contemporary Criticisms of ‘Public Interest Litiga-
tion’: A Progressive Conception of the Role of a Judge 31–33 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (arguing that “[t]he Indian Parliament’s decline from being a genuinely delib-
erative forum . . . is well documented” and that “in several PILs, the Court has consciously sought 
to act as a deliberative forum for policy making, and . . . judges should continue to be sensitive to 
the need to focus upon filling the deliberative gap”). 
 46 See, e.g., Soli Sorabjee, The Ideal Remedy: A Valediction, in THE SUPREME COURT VER-
SUS THE CONSTITUTION: A CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 199, 209 (Pran Chopra ed., 2006) (“You 
may say that this is not the function of the court. But look at [it] in the larger context. Look at the 
relief that it has provided to this neglected segment of humanity. . . . I would say that with all its 
deficiencies, the Supreme Court has been the protector of the Fundamental Rights of the people.”). 
But see Shubhankar Dam, Vineet Narain v. Union of India: “A Court of Law and Not Justice”—Is 
the Indian Supreme Court Bound by the Indian Constitution?, 2005 PUB. L. 239, 247 (“[I]t does 
not follow that every role assigned to the executive or the legislative branches, when not per-
formed appropriately, must be usurped by the Supreme Court.”). 
 47 For criticisms of the “conservative” turn in public interest litigation, see sources cited supra 
note 24. See also Shukla, supra note 28, at 3758 (stating that “[t]he portends for the future are 
ominous” because of “[d]eclining authority and erosion of the legislature and executive along with 
an increasingly activist judiciary favouring the haves rather than the have-nots”). For a more gen-
eral critique that emphasizes docket management, selectivity, and other explanations for the de-
clining efficacy of public interest litigation, see Surya Deva, Public Interest Litigation in India: A 
Critical Review, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 19, 31–32 (2009). 
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tribal and poor rural communities were displaced to further development pro-
jects;48 the “relocation” cases, in which polluting industries (and the migrant 
workers who depended on them) were moved outside city limits;49 and the 
“gentrification” cases, in which thousands (sometimes hundreds of thou-
sands) of low-income residents and slum dwellers were evicted from their 
homes pursuant to urban beautification projects.50 The language of these 
newer decisions has been harsher, too. In the gentrification cases, for in-
stance, individuals who used to be “pavement dwellers” became “encroach-
er[s],” and their presence on public lands went from symbolizing their neces-
sity and the state’s failure to symbolizing their thievery and opportunism rela-
tive to upstanding, pay-your-own-way homeowners.51 
Lest they be accused of cherry-picking, critics of current PIL jurispru-
dence can also point to preliminary quantitative studies that suggest these 
landmark disappointments are representative rather than anomalous out-
comes.52 When it comes to modern PIL cases dealing with fundamental 
rights claims, “it seems that claimants from advantaged classes have higher 
win rates than claimants not from advantaged classes”—and, moreover, that 
the disparity between win rates has been increasing over time.53 To be sure, 
there are problems with relying on quantitative studies to show change over 
time in PIL jurisprudence because early PIL cases are harder to access and 
classify and also because experienced PIL plaintiffs may be self-selecting 
                                                                                                                           
 48 E.g., N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, (2003) 3 SCR 152; Tata Hous. Dev. Co. v. Goa Found., 
AIR 2003 SC 4238; Andolan v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3751; see Thiruvengadam, Swal-
lowing a Bitter PIL?, supra note 29, at 522. 
 49 E.g., M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2231. 
 50 E.g., Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 166; Gautam Bhan, “This Is No Longer the 
City I Once Knew.” Evictions, the Urban Poor, and the Right to the City in Millennial Delhi, 21 
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 127, 128, 135 (2009) (noting that the 2004 Pushta eviction in Delhi 
displaced nearly 150,000 people and discussing the shifting characterization of parties and issues). 
For this grouping of PIL cases, see Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a Bitter PIL?, supra note 29, at 
522. 
 51 Bhan, supra note 50, at 134–35 (comparing language from early PIL displacement cases 
with language in comparable cases from 2000 onwards). 
 52 SHANKAR, supra note 28, at 129–66; Gauri, supra note 28, passim. 
 53 Gauri, supra note 28, at 13. Gauri observes that: 
[A]dvantaged class claimants had a 73% probability of winning a Fundamental Rights 
claim for cases in which an order or decision was rendered from years 2000–2008, 
whereas the win rate for claimants not from advantaged classes for the same years was 
47%. For the 1990s, rates were 68% and 47%, respectively. But in the years prior to 
1990, claimants not from advantaged classes enjoyed higher success rates than those 
from advantaged classes. The differences for the 1990s and 2000s are significantly dif-
ferent from each other, based on a simple chi-square test and a simple probit estimation 
. . . . 
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out of the court system54—in other words, decreasing win rates may reflect 
declining merit rather than changing judicial sympathies.55 But the quantita-
tive analyses of public interest litigation are rapidly closing in on these is-
sues and the prognosis still does not look good.56 
All of this is to say that whether they draw on specific case studies or 
sky-view analyses, even supporters of public interest litigation tend to feel 
that “the Supreme Court in the 1990s and in the current decade[s] is refus-
ing to enforce rights which the Court of the 1980s would have.”57 The suc-
cessful PIL petitioner today is increasingly likely to be a middle-class indi-
vidual speaking up on her own behalf about the state’s failures in areas like 
corruption, pollution, and gender equality.58 These are all worthwhile issues 
and they are in keeping with the court’s broader shift towards a “good gov-
ernance” role.59 Still, they are a far cry from the concerns of migrant and 
bonded laborers, child workers, incarcerated under-trials, slum dwellers, 
and wards of state who were the focal points of early PIL cases, and whose 
problems by and large may still need addressing.60 It is increasingly not the 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Jayanth K. Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy and the Role of the Courts in India, 21 AM. 
ASIAN REV. 91, 108–13 (2003) (arguing that social policy advocates who work on behalf of mar-
ginalized communities are less and less likely to use the courts because of litigation expenses, 
procedural complications, and docket backlog, among other reasons). 
 55 See Gauri & Chitalkar, supra note 28, at 5, 8 (stating that “there appears to have been a 
change in the nature of issues being brought to the Court through PILs” and that the “apparent 
increase in the share of advantaged litigants” may be “an artifact of a change in reporting practices 
on the part of the Court”). 
 56 Varun Gauri’s efforts to systematically examine the perceived shift in public interest litiga-
tion have been especially productive. Over a series of papers from 2009 to 2015, Gauri (in some 
cases working with co-authors) has used slightly different data sets and criteria yet found, fairly 
consistently, that public interest litigation largely merits the criticisms levied against it. See Gauri, 
supra note 28; Varun Gauri, Fundamental Rights and Public Interest Litigation in India: Overa-
chieving or Underachieving?, 1 INDIAN J.L. & ECON. 71 (2010) (largely building on the 2009 
paper); Gauri & Chitalkar, supra note 28. 
 57 Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a Bitter PIL?, supra note 29, at 522. 
 58 S. Muralidhar, Public Interest Litigation, 33–34 ANN. SURV. INDIAN L. 525, 563 (1997–98) 
(“The cases that were taken up for detailed consideration by the courts [and decided in 1997–98] 
reflected a perceptible shift to issues concerning governance.”). 
 59 Robinson, supra note 23, at 2 (arguing that the Supreme Court has justified its development 
of the Basic Structure Doctrine and a broad right to life jurisprudence with an “appeal[] not just to 
a broad interpretation of the Indian Constitution, but indeed to broader (almost transcendent) prin-
ciples of ‘civilization’ or good governance”). 
 60 See Usha Ramanathan, Of Judicial Power, FRONTLINE, Mar. 16–29, 2002, http://www.
frontline.in/static/html/fl1906/19060300.htm [https://perma.cc/D23E-2HTK] (observing that “[t]he 
constituency of the court appeared to have changed” in the 1990s, but going on to say that “[w]hat 
perhaps aggravated the sense of injustice, even anger, was the characterisation of the poor as drawn 
by the court”). 
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case that public interest litigation is a “last recourse for the oppressed and 
the bewildered.”61 
As a result of this shift, current conversations about public interest liti-
gation are preoccupied with how to regroup and reverse course. One sug-
gestion has been that judges should step back from the command and con-
trol model of judicial proceedings that has come to characterize PIL cases 
over the last two decades and adopt a more facilitative role—or, in Ameri-
can legal language, that judges should function as mediators when hearing 
PIL suits.62 Another idea is that the Supreme Court should “evolve a set of 
guidelines for restrained and responsible PIL” so that the process regains 
legitimacy and the outcomes reflect greater sensitivity to potential third-
party effects on marginalized communities.63 
The very idea of fixing public interest litigation suggests that it can be 
refashioned to once more reliably produce the kind of progressive results 
achieved during its introductory phase. Of course, few if any current com-
mentators would argue that public interest litigation, even if properly re-
formed, can inevitably produce progressive results.64 But even trying to fix 
public interest litigation to produce mostly progressive reforms is like trying 
to read only half the Indian Constitution, and it deserves a similar response: 
that’s just not how it works.65 
This is not to say that I’m advocating the other extreme—abandoning 
public interest litigation as a hopelessly lost cause—which particularly upset-
ting outcomes like the one in Koushal might tempt us to do.66 That’s as dis-
piriting and unnecessary as some of the proposals to fix public interest litiga-
tion are logistically and politically unrealistic. But before we get to what the 
shift in PIL jurisprudence means for social justice efforts going forward, it’s 
worth considering the stakes a little more deeply. What do the arguments for 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCR 1, 92 (1977). 
 62 Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a Bitter PIL?, supra note 29, at 531. 
 63 Lavanya Rajamani, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India: Exploring Issues of 
Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 293, 321 (2007). 
 64 See Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a Bitter PIL?, supra note 29, at 525 (criticizing Upendra 
Baxi for seemingly suggesting that “the text of the Indian Constitution inexorably points to pro-
gressive ends, ignoring the reality that there can be several conflicting interpretations of what 
exactly the constitutional values are and, more importantly, how they are to be achieved”). 
 65 Nivedita Menon makes a similar argument about the futility of attempting to reverse-
engineer public interest litigation, but for very different reasons. Nivedita Menon, Environment 
and the Will to Rule: Supreme Court and Public Interest Litigation in the 1990s, in THE SHIFTING 
SCALES OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT IN NEO-LIBERAL INDIA 59, 70, 72 (Mayur Suresh & 
Siddharth Narrain eds., 2014) (arguing that it is “a peculiarly liberal hangover to assume that the 
judiciary is a neutral institution that could render radically different effects if it followed one strat-
egy rather than the other” and “perhaps we need to recognize that the judiciary and the law are the 
neo-liberal project”). 
 66 See Koushal, (2014) 1 SCC.  
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or against public interest litigation tell us about law and democracy in India? 
How can such a miniscule body of case law (PIL suits account for less than 
0.5% of the Supreme Court’s docket)67 not only speak to profoundly im-
portant aspects of social life but to the very foundation of democratic govern-
ance? For these questions and more, we need to take a brief detour into the 
recent Delhi High Court and Supreme Court decisions on sodomy. 
II. NAZ AND KOUSHAL 
Naz68 and Koushal69 are big cases, widely discussed. Commentary and 
scholarship on the two decisions is understandably vast in India, but the 
cases’ influence has by no means been geographically limited. In the United 
States, for instance, the New York Times greeted Naz with an op-ed trium-
phantly announcing “Indian Court Overturns Gay Sex Ban.”70 Similarly, in 
the approximately three years since Koushal was handed down, more than a 
dozen articles and notes discussing it have been published in American law 
journals (to say nothing of Indian or international law journals).71 Across 
continents and publication venues, the reviews overwhelmingly celebrate 
Naz and excoriate Koushal.72 This section does not challenge that assess-
                                                                                                                           
 67 Nick Robinson, Too Many Cases, 26 FRONTLINE Jan. 3–16, 2009, http://www.hinduonnet.
com/fline/fl2601/stories/20090116260108100.htm [https://perma.cc/4YHS-NPB6] (“Contrary to 
popular belief . . . [PILs] have one of the court’s lowest acceptance rates . . . . In 2006, the court 
received almost 20,000 letter or postcard petitions . . . that could be considered as PIL. . . . [But] 
only 243 of these 20,000 pleas were even placed before the judges to be considered for admission 
(out of which only a small fraction then made it to regular hearing).”); Gauri, supra note 28, at 10 
(“[O]n average, some 0.4% of ‘cases’ before the Court involve PILs.”). 
 68 Naz Found. v. Gov’t of NCT of Delhi, (2009) 160 DLT 277 (Delhi High Ct.). 
 69 Koushal v. Naz Found., (2014) 1 SCC 1 (2013). 
 70 Heather Timmons & Hari Kumar, Indian Court Overturns Gay Sex Ban, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/world/asia/03india.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/H6X3-
P2HR]. 
 71 These results are based on a search of the legal database Lexis Advance using the following 
string: “Naz Foundation” narrowed by Secondary Materials search within “Koushal” (Feb. 21, 
2016). 
 72 E.g, Bret Boyce, Sexuality and Gender Identity Under the Constitution of India, 18 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 1, 42 (2015) (“The decision of the Supreme Court in Koushal is remarkably thin in 
legal analysis . . . .”); Martha C. Nussbaum, Disgust or Equality? Sexual Orientation and Indian Law, 
6 J. INDIAN L. & SOC’Y 1, 23 (2016) (commenting, in the course of discussing Koushal, that “[a]s for 
law, there is almost nothing there”); Vikram Raghavan, Navigating the Noteworthy and Nebulous in 
Naz Foundation, 2 NUJS L. REV. 397, 398–99 (2009) (arguing that “[a]t its core, Naz Foundation is 
an emphatic reiteration of the vision of India’s founders” and that “it genuinely qualifies for that 
often gratuitously misused epithet of legal writing: ‘a landmark judgment’”) [hereinafter Raghavan, 
Navigating the Noteworthy]; Sujitha Subramanian, The Indian Supreme Court Ruling in Koushal v. 
Naz: Judicial Deference or Judicial Abdication?, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 711, 719 (2015) 
(“[T]he judicial ‘reasoning’ in Koushal v. Naz cannot be rationally arrived at”); Vikram Raghavan, 
Taking Sexuality Seriously: The Supreme Court and the Koushal Case—Part I, LAW & OTHER 
THINGS (Dec. 14, 2013, 8:48 AM), https://lawandotherthings.blogspot.ca/2013/12/taking-sexuality-
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ment: if there is nothing to like in Koushal’s substantive outcome, there is 
considerably less to applaud in what passes for judicial reasoning in the 
opinion. Moreover, the validity of the reasoning in either Naz or Koushal is 
not especially relevant to the larger arguments of this paper concerning 
shifts in public interest litigation and dynamic equilibrium in the Indian 
Constitution. But because it is impossible to discuss a case without actually 
discussing the case, this section will first briefly overview the facts and ar-
guments in Naz and Koushal before placing the decisions in the broader 
context of PIL jurisprudence. 
A. Public Morality, Constitutional Morality, and Feigned Deference 
The named petitioner in Naz was an NGO that concentrates on HIV/ 
AIDS awareness and support in India.73 The Foundation filed a PIL petition 
to have section 377 of the Indian Penal Code read down on the grounds that 
the criminalization of sodomy made men who have sex with men reluctant 
to seek HIV/AIDS support.74 Others joined the effort, including the national 
Ministry of Health and Welfare and an umbrella group called “Voices 
Against § 377 IPC.”75 The respondents included the Ministry of Home Af-
fairs as well as an activist organization called the Joint Action Council Kan-
nur (JACK) and a private individual named B.P. Singhal.76 
The Naz petitioners challenged the constitutionality of section 377 un-
der Article 14 (equal protection), Article 15 (prohibition of, among other 
things, sex discrimination), Article 19 (free speech and expression), and Ar-
ticle 21 (protection of life and personal liberty).77 They also argued that the 
                                                                                                                           
seriously-supreme.html [https://perma.cc/Y3VD-7LQ6] [hereinafter Raghavan, Taking Sexuality 
Seriously] (“Koushal is bad in so many ways. Where does one even begin?”).  
 73 About Us—Naz India, NAZ FOUND. (INDIA) TRUST, http://nazindia.org/naz-india/ [https://
perma.cc/98EW-4PY4]. 
 74 Naz, (2009) 160 DLT at 285. 
 75 Id. at 288–89. The Ministry of Health and Welfare was named as a respondent in the Naz 
Foundation’s writ petition but the ministry submitted a reply affidavit supporting the foundation. 
Id. at 288; Writ Petition at 2, 6–7, Naz, (2009) 160 DLT 277, http://www.lawyerscollective.org/
files/High%20Court%20Writ%20Petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/H27F-Y7S3] [hereinafter Writ Peti-
tion]. “Voices Against § 377 IPC” is also described as a respondent in the High Court’s decision 
but supported the Naz Foundation’s petition. Naz, (2009) 160 DLT at 289–91. 
 76 Naz, (2009) 160 DLT at 286, 291. JACK campaigns against recognition of any causal connec-
tion between HIV and AIDS, as well as against the use of anti-retroviral drugs. Anju Singh, Making 
Waves, Changing Tides; The Story of Joint Action Council Kannur (JACK), India, FREE REPUBLIC 
(Nov. 13, 2001, 6:20 AM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/569758/posts [https://perma.cc/
6WYX-H5WY]. The late B.P. Singhal was a former Director General of Police and Rajya Sabha 
member for the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party. BP Singhal Passes Away, ORGANISER, http://
www.organiser.org/Encyc/2012/10/15/BP-Singhal-passes-away.aspx?NB=&lang=4&m1=&m2=
&p1=&p2=&p3=&p4=&PageType=N [https://perma.cc/AE99-D9G4]. 
 77 Writ Petition, supra note 75, at 8–11. 
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Indian Penal Code’s condemnation of homosexuality was outdated and not 
in keeping with Indian culture.78 But rather than ask for the provision to be 
struck down entirely, the petitioners asked that section 377 be read down to 
criminalize penile-non-vaginal sex only when it is non-consensual or in-
volves a minor.79 
In granting their petition, the Delhi High Court made several constitu-
tional arguments. First, the court held that the Indian Constitution indirectly 
supports a fundamental right to privacy as well as a right to a dignified life, 
and that both rights require protection for private consensual sex acts be-
tween adults (the Article 21 argument).80 Second, and related to this first 
argument, the court held that even if section 377 reflects public morality 
concerning sodomy, public morality alone does not constitute the kind of 
compelling state interest that’s required to restrict a fundamental right.81 
Third, it held that section 377 unfairly targeted a particular community de-
spite being facially neutral (the Article 14 argument).82 And fourth, the 
court held that “sex” includes “sexual orientation” for the purposes of non-
discrimination analysis (the Article 15 argument).83 
Many commentators praised the High Court’s declaration that expres-
sions of public morality via the law are still subject to an overarching “con-
stitutional morality.”84 Others admired the expansion of sex to include sex-
ual orientation,85 while still others called Naz’s subtle re-reading of privacy 
protection—namely, that privacy is linked to persons not places86—its 
“most attractive feature.”87 To be sure, Naz is not perfect: not all of the ar-
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. at 14 (arguing that “[i]nfluenced by Victorian campaigns for sexual purity, and based upon 
an essentially anti-pleasure and anti-sex bias, the British sought to rectify Indian marital, familial and 
sexual arrangements which they viewed as ‘primitive’”). 
 79 Id. at 11, 69–70. 
 80 Naz, (2009) 160 DLT at 293–302. 
 81 Id. at 310–17. The court also made a similar argument by applying strict scrutiny. See id. at 
323–27. 
 82 Id. at 317–22. 
 83 Id. at 323. As Raghavan notes, the court did not engage with the foundation’s Article 19 
argument. Raghavan, Noteworthy and Nebulous, supra note 72, at 412. 
 84 See Rohit Sharma, The Public and Constitutional Morality Conundrum: A Case-Note on 
the Naz Foundation Judgment, 2 NUJS L. REV. 445, 451 (2009) (“This distinction between public 
and constitutional morality . . . . is precisely where the Constitutional importance of Naz Founda-
tion lies.”); see also Nussbaum, supra note 72, at 20 (stating, of Koushal, that “the claim of public 
morality is the central claim” advanced by the petitioners). 
 85 Bret Boyce, supra note 72, at 39 (“In perhaps the most creative part of its opinion, the court 
ruled that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is tantamount to sex discrimination 
prohibited by Article 15.”). 
 86 Naz, (2009) 160 DLT at 300. 
 87 Raghavan, Navigating the Noteworthy, supra note 72, at 403. 
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guments that could have been made were made or made well.88 But overall, 
both the outcome and the reasoning have been widely celebrated. 
Conversely, Koushal has inspired little besides anger and ridicule. The 
named petitioner, an astrologer, filed one of the many PIL suits challenging 
Naz on broadly religious or cultural grounds that were eventually consoli-
dated for consideration by the Supreme Court.89 The actual petitioners in 
Koushal included several individuals (including B.P. Singhal of Naz fame), 
two small political parties, a Keralite church alliance, JACK (also a Naz 
participant), the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, and a government 
entity called the Delhi Commission for the Protection of Child Rights.90 
The Koushal petitioners argued, among other things, that the High 
Court’s findings of fact as to the harms caused by section 377 were insuffi-
cient—in other words, that there wasn’t enough proof that the provision 
discouraged people from seeking HIV/AIDS support or that it caused priva-
cy or dignity harms.91 They also challenged Naz’s holding that section 377 
discriminates against homosexuals as a class and that sex discrimination 
encompasses sexual-orientation discrimination.92 And several petitioners 
also made variants of a claim that the High Court had violated the separa-
tion of powers by failing to defer to the will of Parliament and, by exten-
sion, to the existence of a public morality that condemns same-sex acts.93 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Pritam Baruah, Logic and Coherence in Naz Foundation: The Arguments of Non-
Discrimination, Privacy, and Dignity, 2 NUJS L. REV. 505, 511–13 (2009) (arguing that the cases 
cited by the court do not support the idea that sex discrimination encompasses sexual-orientation 
discrimination, and that Naz inadequately defined the concepts of privacy and autonomy); see also 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex Equality, Liberty, and Privacy: A Comparative Approach to the Feminist 
Critique, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES 242 (Zoya Hasan 
et al. eds., 2005) (generally critiquing the use of privacy arguments for the purposes of advancing 
gender justice). See generally Raghavan, Navigating the Noteworthy, supra note 72 (highlighting 
some of the decision’s shortcomings with respect to its organization, its treatment of Section 377’s 
legislative and case law history, and its reliance on “soft law” principles, among other things); Sujit 
Choudhry, How to Do Comparative Constitutional Law in India: Naz Foundation, Same Sex Rights, 
and Dialogical Interpretation, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA, supra note 
29, at 55 (“Naz Foundation has a conceptual lacuna at its very heart, created by the court’s failure to 
justify the centrality of comparative constitutional reasoning to its judgment.”). 
 89 Koushal, (2014) 1 SCC at 24. 
 90 Id. at 24–28. On the petitioners’ claim to standing, see Raghavan, Taking Sexuality Serious-
ly, supra note 72 (“[The Koushal court] seemed untroubled that a sovereign government preroga-
tive was, in effect, being outsourced to third parties. . . . [who] had established neither their stakes 
nor their competence to defend Section 377.”). 
 91 Koushal, (2014) 1 SCC at 28–29. 
 92 Id. at 31 (“Shri Huzefa Ahmadi submitted that the right to sexual orientation can always be 
restricted on the principles of morality and health. He referred to the Constituent Assembly De-
bates on Article 15 to show that the inclusion of sexual orientation in the term ‘sex’ was not con-
templated by the Founding Fathers.”). 
 93 The Delhi Commission for the Protection of Child Rights argued that “the legislature has 
treated carnal intercourse against the order of nature as an offence” and that “[t]he presumption of 
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There’s not much in the way of original reasoning in Koushal, but sub-
sequent commentators have teased out the following arguments from its 
decidedly minimalist analysis: (1) section 377’s prohibition of sodomy is 
presumptively constitutional because the Indian Penal Code was duly en-
acted (in 1860) and remains unamended on this point;94 (2) this presump-
tion of constitutionality stands because the High Court did not establish that 
sufficiently severe harms are inflicted upon sufficiently numerous people in 
the course of valid (that is, non-discriminatory) efforts to enforce the provi-
sion;95 (3) people who engage in carnal intercourse “against the order of 
nature” are a separate class such that different laws can be applied against 
them without constitutional difficulty.96 
Needless to say, there are problems with this—not because there was 
no plausible argument to be made for reversing the Delhi High Court, but 
because Koushal contained virtually no argument at all. Most of the Su-
preme Court’s review of Naz is perplexing or just plain wrong; all that is 
seemingly left coherent in Koushal is the bare argument of judicial defer-
ence to legislative acts.97 Deference, of course, is a perfectly legitimate 
ground for declining to invalidate a law, even in the relatively deference-
thin context of the Indian federal judiciary. But because the Koushal court 
made no attempt to grapple with the issues—an absence made clear by page 
after page of block quotations cribbed from other judges’ efforts at grap-
pling—its deference appears to be nothing more than a small and rather 
transparent fig leaf.98 
Having said all this, my intent is not to demonstrate why Koushal is a 
bad decision since it has been pretty thoroughly picked apart. Indeed, for 
our purposes, Naz and Koushal are interesting not because they are exem-
plars of legal reasoning or the lack thereof, but because they exemplify dif-
ferent trends in public interest litigation. To see why, we need to step back 
from the opinions and focus instead on the litigants and issues. 
                                                                                                                           
constitutionality is strong and the right claimed should have been directly violated by the statute.” Id. 
at 30. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) argued that “the matter should have 
been left to Parliament to decide as to what is moral and what is immoral and whether the section in 
question should be retained in the statute book.” Id. at 32. 
 94 Subramanian, supra note 72, at 714; see also Vrinda Narain, Postcolonial Constitutional-
ism in India: Complexities & Contradictions, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 107, 129 (2016). 
 95 Boyce, supra note 72, at 43–44; Subramanian, supra note 72, at 743–44. 
 96 Boyce, supra note 72, at 44. 
 97 Id. at 46–47; Narain, supra note 94, at 129; Subramaniam, supra note 72, at 735–40. 
 98 Gautam Bhatia, The Unbearable Wrongness of Koushal vs Naz, OUTLOOK (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-unbearable-wrongness-of-koushal-vs-naz/288823 
[https://perma.cc/U5NR-8JC6] (arguing that “[t]o frame this as an issue of ‘restraint’, and argue 
that the Court was operating on the principle of judicial restraint is deeply misleading”). 
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B. Competing Public Interests 
Detached from section 377 and the criminalization of sodomy, Naz and 
Koushal are easily recognizable as examples of “classic” and “contempo-
rary” PIL suits. Consider the moving parties: Naz was brought by a coali-
tion of progressive-minded civil society actors and sympathetic government 
subsidiaries,99 while Koushal was brought by a coalition of individual liti-
gants and community organizations—religious rather than residential, per-
haps, but community organizations nonetheless.100 Or take the underlying 
goals of the suits as they are stated by the moving parties. The original writ 
petition submitted by the Naz Foundation in 2001 repeatedly references 
affirmative rights and social attitudes—“self-respect and dignity” on the one 
hand, and “doctrinaire and outmoded conception[s] of sexual relations” on 
the other.101 Conversely, the Koushal petitioners explained their motivations 
primarily using the language of religious or cultural protection and judicial 
deference.102 And finally, remember for whom the moving parties were act-
                                                                                                                           
 99 On the similarity between the Naz petitioners and classic PIL petitioners, compare Naz, 
(2009) 160 DLT at 285, 288–91, with Baxi v. Uttar Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 308 (1981) (law pro-
fessor filing a PIL case on behalf of the residents of a women’s home), and Khatoon v. Bihar, 
(1979) 3 SCR 169 (lawyer filing a writ petition on the basis of newspaper articles documenting the 
circumstances of accused persons awaiting trial). See also Baxi, supra note 16, at 116–17 (de-
scribing similar landmark PIL cases filed by sympathetic elite actors). 
 100 On the similarity between the Koushal petitioners and contemporary PIL petitioners, com-
pare Koushal, (2014) 1 SCC at 24–28, with Gautam Bhan, The Impoverishment of Poverty: Re-
flections on Urban Citizenship and Inequality in Contemporary Delhi, 26 ENV’T & URBANIZA-
TION 547, 551, 553 (2014) (quoting Pitampura Sudhar Samiti v. Gov’t of NCT of Delhi, WP(C) 
4215/1995 (Sept. 27, 2002) (Delhi High Ct.)) (discussing petitioners’ argument “that they [were] 
‘. . . a voluntary association of law abiding, peace-loving bonafide residents’ . . . who ha[d] . . . 
‘purchased the plots and constructed their respective houses from their hard earned money’” and 
the court’s description of the public lands in question as having “‘been encroached by slum dwell-
ers who have no right, title or interest in the said land and are merely trespassers’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 101 Writ Petition, supra note 75, at 6 (“[U]nless the self-respect and dignity of sexuality mi-
norities is restored by doing away with discriminatory laws such as Section 377, it will not be 
possible to promote HIV/AIDS prevention . . . .”); id. at 12 (“Section 377 is indeed based upon a 
doctrinaire and outmoded conception of sexual relations, which has later been used to legitimize 
discrimination against sexuality minorities.”). 
 102 See, e.g., Koushal, (2014) 1 SCC at 30–31 (“[I]f the declaration made by the High Court is 
approved, then India’s social structure and the institution of marriage will be detrimentally affect-
ed and young persons will be tempted towards homosexual activities.”) (argument of the Trust 
God Missionaries); see also id. at 31 (“[C]ourts, by their very nature, should not undertake the 
task of legislating.”) (argument of the AIMPLB). Some of the Koushal petitioners also appealed to 
child protection and the non-absolute nature of all rights. See id. at 32 (“[A]ll fundamental rights 
operate in a square of reasonable restrictions.”) (argument of Suresh Kumar Koushal); Pallavi 
Polanki, Why Delhi Child Rights Commission Opposed De-criminalization of Gay Sex, FIRSTPOST 
(Dec. 14, 2013, 11:27 AM), http://www.firstpost.com/india/why-delhi-child-rights-commission-
opposed-de-criminalisation-of-gay-sex-1286883.html [https://perma.cc/W8JG-VLTR] (“In the last 
150 years, there have been only 200 cases where this section has been effectively applied. All 
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ing: marginalized and scorned minorities in Naz, versus themselves and 
similarly situated citizens in Koushal. 
Seen in this light, Naz is clearly the archetype of the classic PIL suit in 
which philanthropic third-parties fight to change Indian society by defend-
ing or expanding the rights of disadvantaged groups. And just as surely—
though perhaps not as clearly—Koushal is emblematic of a more contempo-
rary PIL suit in which parties who are motivated by a sense of personal 
harm fight to hold the state up to its obligations as the agent of a sovereign, 
rights-bearing democratic citizenry.  
It’s true that Koushal stands somewhat apart from the new model of PIL 
suits inasmuch as it focuses on religious, cultural, and moral claims rather 
than on economic or good-governance demands.103 But this difference does 
not fundamentally change the fact that Koushal, like many of the contempo-
rary PIL suits decried by court-watchers and legal scholars, emphasizes the 
state’s duty to be a good agent of the petitioners rather than a good reformer 
of society. 
It also doesn’t matter that the outcome sought by the Koushal petitioners 
may be fundamentally distasteful in a way that, say, preferring parks over 
nursing homes is not.104 The fact that Koushal stands apart from many other 
                                                                                                                           
those cases applied to sodomy and in more than 90 per cent of the cases, the victims were minors. 
So the application of the Section 377 was to protect victims . . . .”). 
 103 Interestingly, and despite their focus on religious and cultural protection, there’s no reason to 
think the Koushal petitioners drew on section 295(A) of the Indian Penal Code, which prohibits 
harms to religious sentiments under various circumstances. Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860, PEN. 
CODE §§ 295–298, http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=186045 [https://perma.cc/37YU-KYMD]. 
The Koushal opinion itself makes no reference to section 295, and this element of the statute does 
not seem to figure in public conversations (including those emphasizing the petitioners’ point of 
view). Perhaps this is because section 295(A) punishes “deliberate and malicious” action that 
offends religious beliefs—it would translate to something like a criminal charge of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (for religion) in the American context—and it seems ludicrous to 
think of Naz Foundation members being imprisoned or otherwise subject to criminal liability for 
their advocacy and social work. Naz Foundation, after all, would not even be in a position analo-
gous to the doctors in Griswold who were subject to criminal liability for prescribing contracep-
tives. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480–81 (1965). While it’s always risky to in-
dulge in ex post facto speculation regarding litigation strategies, the most plausible explanation for 
the fact that Koushal omitted any section 295(A) arguments might simply be that petitioners and 
judges alike decided the approach would be politically unpopular, or that the credibility of PIL 
suits depends on the petitioners’ ability to demonstrate that they “have no personal, political or 
financial interest of any kind in the public interest litigation brought.” Susman, supra note 20, at 
70 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, there remains a troubling potential for overlap between section 
295(A) and section 377. Given the wide and frequently specious net cast by the Koushal petition-
ers, an argument combining the two IPC sections and applying them against LGBT individuals 
wouldn’t have seemed wholly out of place. 
 104 See Bangalore Med. Tr. v. B. S. Muddappa, (1991) 3 SCR 102, 105 (a PIL suit in which 
the petitioner-appellees argued that the Bangalore Development Authority wrongly allotted public 
land reserved for a park to a private medical trust for the construction of a nursing home). The 
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contemporary PIL suits—to say nothing of classic ones—in its espousal of a 
socially conservative rather than a neo-liberal morality just goes to show that 
public interest litigation is incapable of returning consistently progressive or 
even consistently non-progressive results. Indeed, variations on this point are 
being made with growing frequency by the commentators discussed in Part I. 
What isn’t being said is that the fact that public interest litigation gets de-
ployed to inconsistent ends—notwithstanding the specific outcomes in Naz 
and Koushal—is a reflection of something fundamental and fundamentally 
good in the Indian Constitution. 
III. DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
If Naz105 and Koushal106 represent the great divide in public interest lit-
igation, why should legal liberals be anything but let down by the trajectory 
they see? After all, Indian law and politics are strikingly concerned with 
social uplift.107 Why isn’t it cause for disappointment when a once-
celebrated path to progressive ends turns out to lead elsewhere as well? The 
answer is simply that Indian law and politics—we can even go so far as to 
say Indian constitutionalism and democracy—were never meant to exclu-
sively pursue aspirational goals. That they are meant to pursue such goals is 
beyond question. Nevertheless, as I’ve argued elsewhere, this support for 
government-driven societal reform coexists with contrasting and constitu-
tionally defined political values.108 Indian jurisprudence, including public 
interest litigation, properly reflects the constant recalibration between these 
different visions of state-society relations. 
                                                                                                                           
language of Bangalore nicely captures the turn to middle-class interests and a vision of the state as 
agent rather than sovereign: “[I]n a democratic set up the people or community being sovereign, 
the exercise of discretion must be guided by the inherent philosophy that the exerciser of discre-
tion is accountable for his action” and “[p]ublic park as a place reserved for beauty and recreation 
is associated with growth of the concept of equality and recognition of importance of common 
man.” Id. at 109, 144. 
 105 Naz Found. v. Gov’t of NCT of Delhi, (2009) 160 DLT 277 (Delhi High Ct.). 
 106 Koushal v. Naz Found., (2014) 1 SCC 1 (2013). 
 107 See Steven Barnes, Challenges to Rule of Law and Gender Equality Globally, CASE IN 
POINT, at 19:32–:48 (Feb. 16, 2016), http://caseinpoint.org/live/news/5879-challenges-to-rule-of-
law-and-gender-equality#.VtH6h0tSxuZ [https://perma.cc/CFY2-V6EP] (discussion with Indira 
Jaising and Rangita de Silva de Alwis). Indira Jaising, a prominent Supreme Court advocate, 
commented: “The Constitution of India is very much focused on social change. And so we as 
citizens, as lawyers, whenever we look at a program or whenever we criticize a program, we have 
this one test in front of us: how is it going to advance social justice?” Id. 
 108 Das Acevedo, supra note 11; Deepa Das Acevedo, Religion, Law, and the Making of a 
Liberal Indian State 31–80 (June 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chica-
go) (on file with author). 
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Briefly put, the two underlying impulses in this constitutionally en-
shrined dynamic equilibrium correspond to two understandings of demo-
cratic sovereignty. On the one hand, the Indian Constitution is “a social 
document” and a “majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at fur-
thering the goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution 
by establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement.”109 In the mili-
tant vision of democratic ordering, the state exercises far more than the dis-
cretionary authority we might ordinarily expect of an agent or representa-
tive—for example, it can regulate anything touching the secular aspects of 
religion.110 (In practice, it also regulates a great deal touching the religious 
aspects of religion, but that’s beyond the scope of this paper.111) 
Indeed, many of the Constitution’s provisions and the practices they 
give rise to reflect an explicitly articulated worry that Indian citizens are not 
yet capable of fully exercising their authority as democratic sovereigns. 
Take, for example, the concerns of some drafters—eventually reflected in 
constitutional prose—that unlimited individual freedoms would hamper the 
state’s ability to reform society.112 Or consider Justice Bhagwati’s worry 
that the average Indian’s religious beliefs would, if unchecked and un-
changed, encourage a whole host of violent and discriminatory practices.113 
Basic structure doctrine, too, reflects a mistrust of untrammeled popular 
democracy, inasmuch as it places the undefined “essential features” of the 
Constitution beyond parliamentary revision (although admittedly India’s 
                                                                                                                           
 109 GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 50 (1966). 
 110 INDIA CONST. art. 25(2) (“Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing 
law or prevent the State from making any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, 
political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice . . . .”); see also 
P.N. Bhagwati, Religion and Secularism Under the Indian Constitution, in RELIGION AND LAW IN 
INDEPENDENT INDIA 35, 45 (Robert D. Baird ed., 2d enlarged ed. 2005) (discussing this aspect of 
Article 25 and stating that it “seeks to reconcile the legitimate claims of religion with the equally 
legitimate claims of the State which is committed to the task of creating a new social order”). 
 111 See, for example, the discussion of temple-entry cases discussed in Fuller, supra note 15; 
see also Deepa Das Acevedo, Secularism in the Indian Context, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 138, 
151–54 (2013) (discussing the Indian judiciary’s use of “internal regulation,” or a strategy where-
by courts regulate religious practices using terms and sources internal to the religion itself). 
 112 AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 64 (describing Amrit Kaur and A.K. Ayyar’s views that the 
freedom of religion and equality before the law should be worded so that they do not interfere 
with the state’s mission to transform social relations). 
 113 Bhagwati, supra note 110, at 43 (“[India’s constitutional framers] knew that, left to itself, 
religion could permit orthodox men to burn widows alive on the piers [sic] of their deceased hus-
bands. It could encourage and in its own subtle ways, even coerce indulgence in social evils like 
child marriage or even crimes like human sacrifice or it could consign women to the perpetual fate 
of devadasis or relegate large sections of humanity to the sub-human status of untouchability and 
inferiority.”). It’s worth noting that Bhagwati was one of the Supreme Court justices who created 
public interest litigation. 
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founding document is far more open to amendment than its un-entrenched 
American counterpart).114 
In light of all this, any suggestion that Indian democracy is straight-
forwardly founded on the idea of citizen sovereignty has more holes than 
Swiss cheese. It is not merely that India, like all countries, operates under a 
de facto arrangement whereby “elites, not masses, govern.”115 It is that the 
Indian state is meant to have a share in sovereign authority so that it can do 
more than just realize specific goods set out in advance by the people being 
governed. And it is in exactly this spirit that classic PIL petitioners and 
courts set out to improve the lives of India’s most marginalized citizens. 
On the other hand, it would also be incorrect to say that a more con-
ventional understanding of democratic sovereignty as citizen-sovereignty 
finds no place in Indian constitutional law or practice. The Indian Constitu-
tion guards against incursions into the private lives of individuals by allow-
ing for conventionally liberal protections like “freedom of conscience and 
free profession, practice and propagation of religion.”116 B.N. Rau famously 
campaigned against including a due process clause in the Constitution after 
his conversations with James Bradley Thayer and Felix Frankfurter led him 
to believe it would be an undemocratic check on the legislative process.117 
Above all else, though, many Indians—not just the drafters of the Constitu-
tion—were “intellectually committed to the liberal democratic tradition” as 
well as the idea that individual adult suffrage as the basis of political life 
was the “sine qua non of independence.”118 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in COM-
PARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13, 15 (András 
Koltay ed., 2015) (noting that “nothing in the United States Constitution is today formally una-
mendable”); SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA, at xxix 
(2009); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Inner Conflict of Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the 
‘Basic Structure,’ in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES 179, 
179–80, 194–96 (Zoya Hasan et al. eds., 2005); David Gwynn Morgan, The Indian “Essential 
Features” Case, 30 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 307, 308 (1981). The basic structure doctrine was first 
announced in Kesavananda v. Kerala. AIR 1973 SC 1461. 
 115 THOMAS R. DYE & HARMON ZIEGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY 1 (14th ed. 2009). 
 116 INDIA CONST. art. 25. 
 117 Abhinav Chandrachud, Of Constitutional ‘Due Process,’ HINDU (May 24, 2010, 12:02 AM), 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/of-constitutional-due-process/article436586.ece [https://
perma.cc/8S5Q-J9U9]. This “check” was eventually introduced by none other than Justice Bhagwati. 
See Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621. For a discussion of Thayer and Frankfurter’s 
influence on Rau, see AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 103, and Arvind Elangovan, A Constitutional 
Imagination of India: Sir Benegal Narsing Rau Amidst the Retreat of Liberal Idealism (1910–
1950) at 21 (Dec. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with 
author). 
 118 AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 41, 46. 
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It is probably harder to recognize this vision of undivided citizen sov-
ereignty in contemporary public interest litigation than it is to see shared 
sovereignty in classic PIL cases—and it’s also risky to imply, even indirect-
ly, that citizen sovereignty naturally fits with social conservatism or neo-
liberal politics. I am only making the first of these arguments, namely, that 
contemporary public interest cases often align with liberal democratic ideas 
of statehood and personhood as these are broadly and conventionally under-
stood. PIL petitioners who argue for the municipal maintenance of common 
spaces over the rights of slum dwellers rely on a view of the individual-in-
society, with all its accompanying baggage about public/private divides, that 
is decidedly and classically liberal.119 PIL petitioners who argue for trans-
parency and accountability in governance rely on a view of sovereign dele-
gation and agency theory that is decidedly and classically democratic.120 
And, whatever their particular merits or appeal, PIL petitioners who argue 
for the preservation of religious and cultural mores—at least, for their 
preservation until the legislature shouts otherwise—are relying on liberal 
democratic conceptions of society and sovereignty that also have a place in 
India’s founding document.121 
CONCLUSION 
Saying that Naz and Koushal and public interest litigation all reflect a 
dynamic equilibrium between different visions of sovereignty does not by 
itself establish that having such a dynamic equilibrium is good. Nor, for that 
matter, does it give us much of an idea as to how we should proceed—with 
Koushal, with public interest litigation, or with understanding Indian consti-
tutional law more generally. So far I have been concerned with making an 
interpretive argument about processes at various levels of law in India, but 
let me close with a few thoughts on what this argument does and does not 
mean for the way forward. 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See, e.g., Samiti, WP(C) 4215/1995; discussion supra note 100. 
 120 See, e.g., Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226, 235 (concerning the Central Bureau 
of Investigation’s failure to investigate evidence suggesting that high-ranking politicians and bu-
reaucrats were trading government contracts for bribes); Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 
6 SCC 530 (concerning allegations that the Minister of State for Petroleum and Gas had improper-
ly allotted petrol pump and gas agencies to government officials or their relatives). 
 121 Again, I do not mean to say that the Koushal court’s acceptance of the deference argument 
was sound. As Vikram Raghavan points out, the court’s invocation of deference was inappropriate 
because the government had decided it “would abstain from asking the Court to revive the statute” 
and “even opposed a stay of the high court’s ruling while the appeals were pending before the 
Supreme Court”—and, moreover, that the “Attorney General explained all this to the Court in no 
uncertain terms.” Raghavan, Taking Sexuality Seriously, supra note 72. 
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 First, it most certainly does not mean that progressives should applaud 
Koushal or that we should stop fighting for broadly left-center causes. It 
also does not mean that anyone should denigrate or de-emphasize the very 
real, very aspirational elements of the Indian Constitution and of democracy 
in India. But it does mean that progressives shouldn’t respond to the so-
called “conservative turn” in public interest litigation by throwing up our 
hands or by scrambling for newer, better fixes. Public interest litigation 
can’t be “fixed,” if fixing it means ensuring that it only (or even mostly) 
produces progressive outcomes, any more than we can “fix” the Indian 
Constitution. It shouldn’t be fixed in this way. The great good sense of Indi-
an constitutional law has been its flexibility; its incorporation of all kinds of 
legal traditions in the nation’s charter, its catholicism in selecting mecha-
nisms and sources and analytic rubrics when interpreting that charter, and 
its willingness to rewrite the charter with the benefit of lessons learned. The 
dynamic equilibrium between different visions of sovereign authority that I 
have described elsewhere and the particular manifestation of that dynamic 
in public interest litigation that I have described here is just one more ex-
ample of the flexibility that has served India more than tolerably well for 
nearly seventy years. 
